The paper studies equilibria for economies with imperfect competition and non-convex technologies. Following Negishi, firms maximise profits under downward-sloping perceived demand functions. Negishi's assumptions, in particular the assumption of a single monopolistic competitor in each market, are relaxed. Existence of equilibria is obtained, under otherwise standard assumptions, for productions sets defined in each firm by the union of a convex technology and a technology subject to fixed costs. In the light of a counterexample, it is assumed that fixed factors are distinct from variable factors.
Motivation and Guidelines
This paper is a modest contribution to the challenging topic of general equilibrium under imperfect competition and non-convex technologies. The topic is important because fixed costs and increasing returns to scale -hence, barriers to entry and concentrated production -are a major source of market power.
Currently available results are meager. Without attempting to review these, we note that some models -e.g. Novshek and Sonnenschein (1978) or Hart (1979) -deal with many firms tat are or become small relative to the aggregate economy. In contrast, others -e.g. Heller (1993) -concentrate on a single monopolist embedded in an otherwise competitive economy. Others still -e.g.
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987, section IV) -rely on specific models endowed with strong symmetry properties. In contrast, we introduce a methodological approach that holds promises of substantial generality, comparable to that of competitive analysis -even if we do not exploit these promises fully here.
Our approach builds on two main contributions: (i) the perceived-demand approach to monopolistic competition, introduced in the seminal paper by Negishi (1961) ; (ii) the pricing-rules approach to firm behaviour, introduced in the seminal paper by Dierker, Guesnerie and Neuefeind (1985) and applied to competitive-like equilibrium under non-convex technologies by Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988) , Dehez and Drèze (1988a,b) .
The motivation for adopting the perceived-demand approach is twofold.
First, it simplifies the general equilibrium analysis, a welcome feature given the analytical difficulties introduced by non-convexities. Second, it is in our opinion more realistic, in many situations, than the alternative, objective-demand approach. Endowing firms with the ability to compute general equilibrium reactions to their own market behaviour typically stretches the concept of rationality far beyond realistic limits. 1 Of course, Negishi's formulation has its sense that they are the lowest prices at which the producers remain willing to satisfy demand. The pricing rules formalise condition (ii). An equilibrium exists, under otherwise standard assumptions, whether production sets are convex or not. Two properties of the pricing rules are used in the existence proof: (P1) the rules are defined by correspondences which are upper hemicontinuous (u.h.c), convex-, compact-and non-empty valued (c.c.n.v); (P2) the rules imply non-negative profits.
Under monopolistic competitionà la Negishi, condition (ii) above must be modified to become: (ii') at these output prices, profits, evaluated on the basis of the perceived-demand functions, are maximal. Such a condition raises a specific difficulty. A pricing rule must be defined at every point on the frontier of the firm's production set. For some of these points, there do not exist nonnegative prices sustaining the point as a profit maximising production plan.
For instance, if marginal revenue becomes negative when output y exceeds some level y, then the set of non-negative prices defined by (ii') is empty for all y > y. Yet, the pricing rule should be non-empty valued also there.
To resolve that dilemma, we define pricing rules under which the prices stipulated at points where (ii') is violated cannot prevail at equilibrium. The rules are defined everywhere, but market equilibrium is not possible everywhere. In this exploratory paper, we assume strict monotonicity of preferences, so that equilibrium prices are strictly positive. And we impose: (P3) the rules are such that the first-order conditions (FOC) for profit maximisation under subjectively-perceived demand functions are verified, or else some price is non positive. Accordingly, the FOC are verified at equilibrium.
The resulting equilibria thus have a "bounded rationality" connotation, because: (i) first-order conditions are by nature local, and a local optimum need not be global; (ii) the demand elasticities need not be perceived correctly.
Item (i) seems inescapable, in the absence of convexity. From a technical view-point, existence of several isolated local optima, only some of which are global, introduces discontinuities in the profit-maximising supply correspondence that preclude recourse to Kakutani's fixed-point theorem. From an economic viewpoint, global optimisation imposes two unrealistic demands on firm behaviour, namely ability to solve a global optimisation problem not always amenable to standard techniques; and ability to perceive demand characteristics at allocations arbitrarily remote from experience.
In section 2, we record the immediate result that an equilibrium exists, under otherwise standard assumptions plus strict monotonicity of preferences (A1), when firms hold pricing rules verifying (P1), (P2) and (P3). 6 The rest of the paper deals with primitive assumptions under which such pricing rules exist.
In order to pave the ground, we first develop a pricing-rule approach to Negishi's model, under convex technologies (section 3). Negishi (1961 Negishi ( , 1972 assumes that: (i) there is at most one monopolistic competitor in each market;
(ii) perceived demand functions are linear and consistent with observations (in levels, not necessarily slopes); (iii) the perceived-demand coefficients are continuous functions of market prices and market net demands to the firm. We generalise (i) by allowing every firm to hold non-competitive net-demand perceptions on all markets but one; 7 and we generalise (iii) by allowing the coefficients to depend -continuously -on the full allocation. These generalisations are of interest in their own right.
But we use three ancillary assumptions: (A1) every commodity is strictly desired by at least one consumer; (A2) perceived inverse demand functions are continuous; (A3) each firm holds competitive price perceptions for at least one commodity.
6 Reminder: pricing rules are an abstract tool of the economist exploring a technical issue; in particular, they may be devoid of behavioural connotations out of equilibrium.
7 This generalisation defines in what sense we extend Negishi's approach from monopolistic to imperfect competition. Turning to non-convex technologies, the challenge is to ascertain the existence of pricing rules endowed with properties (P1), (P2), (P3). Under linear demand functions, whether or not properties (P1)-(P3) are mutually consistent depends upon the production set. We give in section 4 a simple example of a production set for which there does not exist a pricing rule with the desired properties. In the light of that example, we define a restricted class of technologies, for which (P1)-(P3) are mutually consistent.
Our restricted class consists of technologies with fixed costs where (A4) , for each firm: (i) the fixed inputs are distinct from the variable inputs or the outputs; and (ii) the production set is the union of two convex sets, one and one only of which contains the origin. The extension to an arbitrary finite union of convex sets, each allowing for fixed costs, is at hand. Unless one of these contains the origin, there always exist (local) equilibria where the firm is inactive: upper hemi-continuity implies that the pricing rule places no restriction on admissible prices there (see section 4 for illustration); and there will exist an equilibrium for the sub-economy from which a given firm, or set of firms, is deleted. 8 In section 5, we construct pricing rules verifying (P1)-(P3) for the case where the fixed inputs consist of a single commodity with competitive price perceptions. These two restrictions are used for expositional convenience and are amenable to generalisation. Under standard assumptions and (A1)-(A4), a Negishi equilibrium exists (theorem 5.1). 8 An alternative, introduced in Madden (1984) , consists in showing that an equilibrium with non-zero production (hence fixed investments) exists, provided the consumption sector of the economy is large enough. Madden verifies this by replicating the consumption sector n times and proving the existence of a finite integer n such that, ∀ n ≥ n, the economy replicated n times admits an equilibrium with positive production. The same route could be followed here.
Our excuse for introducing property (i) is simple: it holds trivially whenever fixed costs correspond to investments in facilities giving access to superior operating technologies. Because investments precede operations in time, the fixed inputs are automatically separated from variable inputs and outputs through time indices. 9 Thus, our specification covers in particular all the cases where increasing returns result from fixed investments; that is, it covers many (most?) interesting cases.
Existence of Equilibria with Pricing Rules
Following Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988) 10 or Dehez and Drèze (1988a), hereafter DD, to which we refer for details, consider an economy with commodities, n producers and m consumers. Producer j is characterised by a produc- 11 and -shares in firm profits
It is further assumed that, ∀ k ∈ R , the set 9 An interesting set of technologies close to our class consists of ex ante convex technologies with fixed costs ex post. Under incomplete markets, these technologies may lead to secondbest efficient departures from marginal cost pricing in some states, as suggested in Drèze (2001, section 3.3). 10 Bonnisseau and Cornet do not impose non-negative profits, only bounded losses; but the rules of income formation for households do not embody limited liability of shareholders.
11 Alternatively stated, Y j is "comprehensive". 12 DD assume non-satiation; we substitute (A1) for that requirement.
implying that the set of feasible allocations
We refer to that set of assumptions as (DD), and we add the following: 13
whose preferences are strictly monotonic with respect to x k :
denote by p a price vector in R + and by z = (
Definition 2.1 A pricing rule for firm j φ j : ∂Y j × Z × R + → S is a correspondence assigning to each production plan y j ∈ ∂Y j a set of prices φ j (y j ; z, p) ∈ S, given the market data (z, p). 14 We formalise the assumptions (P1)-(P2) as follows, for each j:
As for assumption (P3), it is implicit in the following
Definition 2.2 An equilibrium with pricing rules is defined by a price vector
p ∈ S and an allocation z ∈ Z such that:
13 Vector inequalities are ≥, >, . Rows vectors are primed. 14 See remark 2.1 below. In DD, φ j = φ j (y j ), but the immediate generalisation to φ j = φ j (y j ; z, p) is mentioned in footnote 18 there.
(E2) p 0 and, for each j, p ∈ φ j (y j ; z, p);
Theorem 2.1 Under assumptions (DD), (A1), (P1) and (P2), there exists an equilibrium.
Proof Follows from existence theorem 2 in DD. All the assumptions there are retained, and (P1) validates the generalisation from φ j (y j ) to φ j (y j ; z, p).One only needs to verify that p 0. As noted above, the set of feasible allocations
Remark 2.1 DD define a pricing rule as a correspondence with values in S, the unit simplex. Careful examination of the proof of their theorem 2 reveals that our alternative definition is still conducive to existence. If
, the result still holds. This mildly surprising remark, which allows for pricing rules specifying some negative prices, will prove essential to our analysis in section 3.
Remark 2.2
As noted above, DD assume that the set of feasible allocations, Z, is bounded. Accordingly, the proof of theorem 2 there relies on the standard technique of restricting attention to allocations belonging to a compact set. Consequently, we need only verify the properties of pricing rules over compact sets, in order to invoke theorem 2.1. Although S is not compact, our correspondences φ j (y; z, p) will be compact-valued, and the image in S of a compact set of triplets (y; z, p) is itself compact (Hildenbrand, 1974, proposition 3, p.24).
Negishi Equilibria under Convex Technology

3.1
In order to apply theorem 2.1 to imperfect competitionà la Negishi, it is necessary and sufficient to specify pricing rules that satisfy postulates (P1)- (P2) and that (i) embody profit maximisation under downward sloping perceiveddemand functions; (ii) entail some non-positive prices at production plans incompatible with profit maximisation.
At a market allocation (z, p), Negishi (1961 Negishi ( , 1972 considers indirect perceived-demand functions defined as
where the matrix H j (·) is negative semi-definite. 15 The interpretation is that the r.h.s of (3.1) gives the prices p j at which firm j expects to be able to trade the quantities y j , when the market data are (z,
consistency with observations).
Because H j (·) is NSD, the profit function is concave, and the first-order conditions (FOC) are sufficient for global profit maximisation, when Y j is convex. Accordingly, we may use that property in condition (i) above and rephrase it as (i') embody the FOC for profit maximisation under the perceived-demand functions (3.1).
Remark 3.1 16 We have defined (3.1) with p ∈ S, thus under a specific price normalisation. It is well known that an oligopolistic equilibrium is not invariant to the choice of a price normalisation. This has been brought out by 15 Negishi (1972, p.111) assumes that the matrix H j has zero entries for commodities of which firm j is not the single monopolistic supplier, and owns a negative definite principal minor for the other commodities. He invokes gross substitutability of direct demand functions as a justification. If the matrix of partial derivatives of the direct demand functions were negative definite, with non-positive off-diagonal elements, then its inverse H would be negative definite with all entries non positive -by application of a theorem of Stieltjes (1886-7). 16 We thank an anonymous referee for prompting this clarification. Returning to (3.1), the fact that p ∈ S does not imply that p j (y j ; z, p) ∈ S.
(Think about a single output with inelastic demand and inputs supplied at constant prices; the output price varies with y j at unchanged input prices, so that p j ∈ S for y j = y j .) But irrelevance of the overall price level requires 17 The practical side of the normalisation issue is intriguing, since economic agents in a market economy are not aware of any price normalisation. But it is suggestive to think about oligopolistic or monopolistic firms as pursuing a real (as opposed to nominal) profit motive. In a monetary economy, they will accordingly deflate future (possibly state-contingent) profits by a price index. The weights of individual commodities in the price index play a role comparable to the quantity units of the previous paragraph. Thus, indices with different weights may lead to different oligopolistic equilibria.
that (3.1) be homogeneous of degree 1 in p. That is, ∀ k ∈ R + :
The perceived-profit function is
3)
The FOC for a maximum of Π j on Y j are again independent of the price level k. They require existence of a vector q j in the normal cone to
Because Y j is comprehensive convex, q j > 0 for every q j ∈ N j (y j ), and
In (3.4), the norm of q j is implicitly related to k. Let
and write (3.4) as
In order to obtain p j (y j ; z, p) ∈ S, it is necessary that
This yields the first-order conditions in normalised form:
18 See e.g., Clarke (1983), proposition 2.3.1 and corollary to proposition 2.4.3.
for y j such that a j (y j ; z, p) > 0 (see below).
These expressions admit standard interpretations. Looking at the i-th component of the vector equalities (3.4), for y j i > 0 (i is an output), the l.h.s. measures the marginal revenue of y j i and the r.h.s. its marginal cost, in a multi-product framework.
The term
measures the difference between the selling price and the marginal revenue, a negative term under normal circumstances. The same difference is added to the marginal cost in the r.h.s. of (3.7); it corresponds there to the monopolistic markup of price above marginal cost. 19 Less familiar is the term 1 + ι H j (z, p)y j := a j (y j ; z, p), which multiplies q j in the r.h.s. of (3.7). Its presence is due to the fact that q j ∈ S is a measure of relative, not absolute marginal costs. The additional term scales marginal cost commensurably with p j . But a new issue arises: is that term positive? We have argued above that H j i (z, p)y j ≤ 0 should be the rule for an output i "under normal circumstances". That term is proportional to y j , and could become large negative for large y j , entailing 1 + ι H j (z, p)y j < 0.
Because q j > 0, a j (y j ; z, p) > 0 is necessary for q j a j (y j ; z, p) ∈ N j (y j ), hence is necessary for (3.7) to represent correctly the FOC.
The interpretation of this issue is straightforward. If y j i > 0 is so large that 1 + ι H j (z, p)y j < 0, the production plan y j generates negative marginal revenues "overall", 20 and y j cannot be a profit-maximising production plan. 21 19 For y i is normally negative for outputs and positive for inputs, a j (·) < 0 is normally brought about by negative marginal revenues for outputs. 21 At y j ∈ ∂Y j , profits increase in a direction pointing inward the comprehensive set Y j (We have already alluded to that situation in section 1.) The pricing rule will have to specify some non-positive prices at such a y j .
Remark 3.2 22 The FOC (3.4), hence (3.7), do not embody the requirement and
z, p and y j consistent with z : at equilibrium, y j = y j enters the definition of
. Accordingly, at equilibrium, the FOC for profit maximisation will be satisfied, for the normalisation ι p = 1 (see remark 3.1 above).
3.2
We now state formally:
(A2) For each j, the mapping (z, p) → H j (z, p) is continuous, and the matrix
(A3) For each j, the matrix H j (z, p) owns at least one row with zero entries identically in (z, p).
Our pricing rule is
φ j (y j ; z, p) = p ∈ R | ∃ q ∈ N j (y) ∩ S : p = q j max(0, 1 + ι H j (z, p)y j ) − H j (z, p)y j max(1, −ι H j (z, p)y j ) . (3.8)
Lemma 3.1 Under assumptions (A2) and (A3), the pricing rules (3.8) satisfies (P1), (P2) and (P3), with ι p ≡ 1, for y j , z and p in compact sets.
(a direction bringing about production inefficiency); thus, y j is not profit maximising. 22 We thank an anonymous referee for prompting this clarification.
Proof We omit the superscript j and, where unnecessary, the reference to (z, p).
(1) Ad ι p ≡ 1. 
3.3
Definition 3.1 A Negishi equilibrium is defined by a price vector p ∈ S and an allocation z ∈ Z such that:
Theorem 3.1 Under assumptions (DD), (A1), (A2) and (A3), if each Y j is a convex set, there exists a Negishi equilibrium, and the maximum in (E.2) is global.
Proof Follows from theorem 2.1, remarks 2.1-2.2 and lemma 3.1.
A Pricing Rule May not Exist with Fixed Costs
In this section, we provide an elementary example of a production set for which there does not exist a pricing rule verifying (P1)-(P3) of section 1.
There are two commodities, an output y and an input x, with respective prices p and r. The production set, also depicted in figure 1, is defined by:
The perceived inverse demand function is here defined, for a fixed (z, p), by
Profits are
The first-order condition for profit maximisation, given x ≤ −c, is
This corresponds to the normalised vector in S
The corresponding profits are
Profits are non-negative, hence maximal at a solution of (4.1), provided
To illustrate, if b = −1, then 1 ≥ŷ ≥ 0 for c ≤ 1.
We wish to construct, on the boundary ∂Y of Y, a pricing rule which is u.h.c (P1), which yields non-negative profits (P2), and is such that either This explains why we introduce the restriction that fixed inputs and variable inputs be disjoint sets of commodities.
Negishi Equilibria with Fixed Costs
We now prove existence of equilibriaà la Negishi for a class of technologies with fixed costs, where for each firm fixed inputs are distinct from variable inputs or outputs, and the production set is the union of two convex sets of which one contains the origin. For simplicity of exposition, we consider a single fixed input, and a fixed investment threshold. We leave open the extension to more complex technologies -where for instance fixed investments could be chosen from some feasible set, each choice giving access to a convex production set for variable inputs and outputs; 23 
That is, Y j is the union of two convex sets, one of which (Y j1 ) stipulates a "fixed cost" y 
To define a pricing rule φ j : ∂Y j × Z × S → S, we can rely on (3.8) for the first and third elements in the union of sets defining ∂Y j ; but we need to extend that specification so as to cover the second and fourth elements, while preserving upper hemi-continuity at y 
0,p
This defines the composition of correspondences:
which is u.h.c (Hildenbrand, 1974, p.22) and n.c.c.v. To verify convex val-
. Also, the upper bound on p f guarantees p y ≥ 0. Lemma 3.1 thus applies to the pricing rule (5.3).
For y
Again, lemma 3.1 applies.
, the construction of the pricing rule is more intricate. For given y = (−c, y −f ), we define:
−f is the intersection of the half-ray y −f + ι −f d 1 with ∂Y 1 −f . The intersection is non empty because Y is closed and {ŷ ∈ Y |ŷ ≥ y} is bounded; it is unique, by definition of ∂Y 1 −f ;ŷ 1 −f is a continuous function of y, for parallel half rays.
Similar properties hold forŶ
Otherwise, there exists (by the reasoning of the previous paragraph)
By the argument spelled out under 3.1 above, lemma 3.1 applies to this correspondence.
For y
Lemma 3.1 now applies trivially. 
Summary
We have investigated the existence of imperfect-competition equilibriaà la
Negishi under some non-convexities in production. We rely on "pricing rules", which have proved useful in earlier work on equilibria with non-convex technologies. Under our rules, either profits are locally maximal given linear perceived-demand functions, or else some price is zero or negative. Assuming that all commodities are strictly desired, profits are locally maximal at equilibrium. (A global maximum is not at hand without convexity.) 25 We focus on production sets consisting of the sum of two convex sets, one of which allows for fixed costs. Our methodology lends itself to generalisations, 25 An equilibrium with y j ∈ ∂Y j1 could yield lower profits than some element of ∂Y j2 and conversely; such global comparisons are not introduced here. 
